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Nominal  anchors  - particularly  wage restraints  - are impor-
tant in stabilization programs in reforming socialist economies.
Without conventional equilibrating mechanisms and effective
market restraints on wages, monopolistic pricing can result in
powerful inflationary pressures and higher-than-warranted out-
put costs.
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An apparently  unique  feature  of classical  centrally  planned  economies
has  been the  absence  of inflation.  However,  it is  generally  accepted  that
inflation  was  repressed  with the  result  that  translation  into  open  inflation
has  become  a  hallmark  of economies  making  the  transition  to market-based
rules. By itself,  the  translation  of repressed  into  open inflation  cannot
explain the acceleration -- and the persistently higher rates --  of inflation
that  has  been  observed  in  reforming  socialist  economies. Moreover,  the
rapidity  of such  acceleration  threatens  to dilute  the  desired  signalling  role
for  prices  and  jeopardizes  the  political  sustainability  of reform.
While  an extensive  literature  exists  that  deals  with the  measurement  of
repressed  inflation  1,  analysis  of open  inflation  is  still  largely  anecdotal 2.
Moreover,  little  attempt  has  been  made  to  pin down  empirically  the
consequences  of the  particular  behavioural  rules  and institutional  routines,
particularly  monopolistic  pricing,  that  are  generally  agreed  to  be
characteristic  of such  regimes. In this  paper  we try  to isolate  key  empirical
regularities  of the  inflation  process  in  reforming  socialist  countries.
Several  features  of the  socialist  economy  distinguish  them  from  standard
market-based  economies  and indicate  areas  for  specific  analytical  treatment.
Such  disparities  include  the  administrative  determination  of  prices,  the  wage
setting  framework  and  the  imposition  of full  employment,  external  trading
prices  and  regimes  and  the  monopolistic  structure  of goods  markets. Further,
1  See,  inter  al'a,  Nuti (1986);  Portes(1977);  Feltenstein  (1989).
2  Honohan  (1989)  for  China  and  Rocha(1990)  for  Yugoslavia  are  among  the  few
exceptior.s.2
such  economies  migh.  be expected  to lack  any  endogenous  mechanism  of
equilibration  given  full  employment  and  an absence  of a conventional  output-
price  relationship.  Incorporating,  where  feasible,  these  specific  features,
we set  up an inflation  model,  calling  on  Hungarian  and  Polish  experience  and
data. We concentrate  on the  propagation  mechanism  --  hence  primarily  on the
short-run  dynamics --  while  drawing  upon  models  f3r  market  economies  with
administered  prices  and  small  numbers  of producers. To  highlight  the  short-
run  dynamics  we estimate  dynamic  price  and  wage  models  using  quarterly  data
that  cover  much  of the  recent  reform  period. Our  atialysis  pays  particular
attention  to the  price-wage  relationship  and  to the  role  of the  exchange  rate
in  determining  domestic  inflation.
The  organization  of the  paper  is  as follows. Section  2  provides  a
discussion  of the  main institutional  features  and  developments  for  both  prices
and  wages  for  Hungary  and  Poland. In the  light  of this  information,  we set  up
a  simple  structural  price  and  wage  model  suitable  for  estimation  in Section  3.
The full  model  is laid  out in  Appendix  1. We then  proceed  on the  basis  of
available  quarterly  data to  estimate  the  reduced  form  equations. The results
are reported  in  Section  4.  Section  5  concludes.
II.  The  Hungarian  and Polish  Settinn
Several  salient  features  can  be extracted  from  Hungarian  and  Polish
experience  with  price  reform  and  inflation  over  the  past  three  decA-es.
First,  there  has  been  a common  and  unambiguous  upward  shift  in  the  price  level
with such  shifts  being  generally  sustained.  Moreover,  Polish  inflation  has
been  maintained  at a consistently  higher  level  over  the  1980s  and  has
exhibited  far  greater  variance  than  in  Hungary.  This  culminated  in a  high
inflation  burst  in  1989  in Poland  followed  by a radical  stabilization  which,3
by late  1990,  had  brought  inflation  down  to  below  five  percent  per  month. In
the  Hungarian  case,  inflation  has  been consistently  ratcheted  upwards,
exceeding  thirty  percent  per  annum  in  1990  with  likely  expansion  to  over  fifty
percent  in 1991.
Second,  both economies  have  moved  away  from  strictly  administratively
determined  prices. A series  of price  liberalization  measures  have  reduced  the
weight  of administered  in  total  prices. Table  1 provides  information  on the
4'-- ibution  of different  price  categories.  It  should  however  be roted  that
neither  free  prices  in  Hungary  nor  contract  prices  in Poland  were  wholly  free
from  administrative  interference.  Established  ratios  of costs  to  profits  in
the  material  sector  and  other  guidelines  constrained  permissible  price  growth.
In  both  economies,  this  diluted  the  potential  impact  on relative  prices  that
might  have  been  expected  to result  from  a shift  in  the  locus  and timing  of
price  adjustments.  Consequently,  major  relative  price  rearrangements  did  not
occur  in  Hungary  until  after  1987;  in  Poland  significant  change  took  place  in
1981/82,  1988-89  and,  more  radically,  with  the  1990  stabilization.  As part  of
this  programme  price  controls  were  almost  totally  abandoned.
Third,  price  liberalization  has  been  associated  with a greater  explicit
3 linking  of domestic  to foreign  prices  . Figures  1 and  2 show  that  imported
inflation  effects  have  become  progressively  more  powerful. In  Hungary,  a
3  Nevertheless,  exchange  rate  appreciation,  subsidies  and  controls  diluted
this effect in Hungary  after 1968.  Between  1973 and 1978 consumer  prices
expanded  at  least  six  percentage  points  below  OECD  rates,  necessitating  a  sharp
upward  adjustment  to the  price  level  in 1979/80  to  eliminate  the  wedge  between
producer  and  consumer  prices. Producer  prices  --  principally  for  exportables  -
- were then  explicitly  linked  to international  prices  through  the  Competitive
Pricing  rule. In  Poland  the  pass-through  of  foreign  prices  remained  relatively
weak for administered  prices.  An Equalization  Settlements  System  equalized
transaction  prices  for exporters  and importers  to domestic  market  prices  via
subsidies  and  taxes.4
Table  1
Consumer  and  Producer  Prices  by Pricing  Category:
Hungary  and  Poland,  1982-89
Category  1982  1984  1985  1987  1988  1989  1990
Consumer  PrLces
Fixed  15  15  6  6  - - -
Flexible  29  28  38  32  20  17  na
Free  56  57  56  62  80  83  na
Producer  Prices
Fixed  33*  30  32  28  25  23  na
Free  67*  70  68  72  75  77  na
PolandC
Consumer  Prices**
Administrative  35  47  47  45  45  45  10
Regulated  15  3  3  2  0  0  0
Contract  50  50  50  53  55  55  90
*_1980;  Flexible  consumer  prices  include  those  subject  to  maximum  limit;  Fixed
producer  prices  also include  all  prices  with  upper  limits  **-  e:pressed  as
share  of total  sales  value  for  products  covered  by price  category.  Since  1990
changes  in contract  prices  no longer  require  notification.  Source:  IMF
pattern  of staggered  adjustment  of producer  then  consumer  to foreign  prices
appears  to  hold from  the  mid-1970s  onwards. Import  and  domestic  consumer
prices  move  more  closely  together  over  the  1980s. After  1986  there  is  a
fairly  sharp  divergence  as Hungarian  inflation  began  rapidly  to  exceed  that  of
its  convertible  trading  partners. In  Poland  co-movement  of import  and
domestic  prices  became  much stronger  after  1982. Following  a competitive
exchange  rate  policy  aimed  at  boosting  exports  and  reducing  the  gap  between
official  and  parallel  rates,  the  result  was  recurrent  depreciation  and  a
strong  imported  infl.cion  effect. In short,  reduction  in the  share  of
administered  in total  prices  and  explicit  association  to foreign  prices  appear4-A
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to  have  allowed  some  linkage,  albeit  very  weak,  of  price  changes  to the  real
side  of the  econo&y. The  conventional  inver_e  output  to  price  relationship
appears  absent.
For  both  Hungary  and  Poland  in  the  1980s  %..sumer  prices,  wages  and  unit
labor  costs  moved  together  closely. For  the  former,  an  amual  inflation  model
covering  the  period  1969-1987  and  relating  change  in consumer  prices  to lagged
inflation,  import  prices,  unit labour  costs  and  an excess  demand  term --
measured  as the  deviation  from  trend  of  M2 over  retail  sales  4--  provides  a
reasonably  robust  explanation  of Hungarian  inflation,  particularly  over  the
pre-1982  period  5.  There  is  no evidence  of structural  change  in  Hungary  over
the  period  to 1987.  Inflation  has  had  a  marked  inertial  component,  as would
be expected  in  a system  with  a significant  share  of administered  prices.
There  is  strong  covariation  of cost  factors  and  domestic  prices. Changes  to
unit labour  costs  and  excess  demand  appear  to  have  been  more  powerful
determinants  than  first-round  import  price  effects  of the  inflation  rate.
For  Poland  over  the  period  1953-1982,  when  prices  were fully  controlled
from  the  centre,  consumer  prices  have  broadly  reflected  movements  in  total
4  If  we take  anticipated  output  to  equr:e.  trend  output  and  assume  that  other
variables  accommodate  to  output,  the  deviation  from  trend  of  the  monetary  impulse
can  be considered  a suitable  proxy  for  excess  demand.
5  Hungary: Annual  Inflation  Model,  1.960-1987
Estimation  Method:  Two Stage  Least  Squares
DLCPI-0.018  + 0.47*DLCPI. 1 +0.18*DLM2RET  +  0.08*DLIMP. 1 +0.32*DULC. 2
(2.6)  (3.55)  (1.98)  (1.69)  (3.15)
+0.04*D79
(3.04)
R2 -0.86;  e-  0.011;  DW  - 2.27
where;  DLCPI-  first  difference  of  log  of  consumer  price  index;  DLM2RET-  deviation
from  trend  of ratio  of  M2 and  real  retail  sales;  DLIMP-  first  difference  of  log
of import  price  index;DULC-  first  difference  of log  of unitcost  variable;
D79  - 1 for  1979  and  0 elsewhere.6
costs. However,  within  this  aggregate  movement,  iarge  changes  in  relative
prices  took  place  in  the  period. Prices  of basic  items  --  food,  transport  and
rents,  as  well  as  energy  --  lagged  consistently  behind  the  overall  price
index. In addition,  monetary  growth  ourpaced  price  growth  in the  seventies,
creating  a significant  imbalance  --  monetary  overhang  --  which  was  further
associated  with  a large  premium  of the  black  market  exchange  rate  over  the
official  exchange  rate. The  price  reform  of 1982,  with the  attendant  jump  in
administered  prices,  aimed  at changing  both relative  prices  and  reducing  the
monetary  overhang. The  initial  jump in  the  price  level  translated  in  an
upward  shift  of the  rate  of inflation  which  stabilized  beforr  1987  at around
15-20  percent  per  annum. Empirical  evidence  including  tests  for  structural
breaks  suggests  that  the  period  post-1982  represents  a  new  regime  in  price
behaviour  and  not simply  an increase  in  the  rates  of inflation  6v  This  result
seems  consistent  with the  qualitative  shift  from  a system  of fully  controlled
prices  to  a  mixed  system  of controlled  and,  in  principle,  market  based  prices.
In summiarizing  the  respective  inflationary  experiences  under  reform,  it
is important  to  understand  why rather  similar  ground-rules  generated  radically
divergent  inflationary  paths. This  can  best  be treated  in relation  to  the
conditions  under  which  the  accelerated  reforms  of the  1980s  were  enacted. In
Poland  that  decade  was  marked  by major  external  imbalances,  persistent  current
account  deficits  and  pressure  on the  exchange  rate. Unlike  for  Hungary,  the
black  market  exchange  rate  premium  remained  ve.j substantial  throughout  the
1980s  --  one indicator  of the  presence  of repressed  inflation  in the  system.
6  Chow  tests  and  recursive  estimations  were  performed  on  an annual  mGdel
for  the  period  1953-89. The  results  were  reported  in  an  earlier  version  of  this
paper  presented  at  a  World  Bank/EDI  seminar  on "Managing  Inflation  in  Socialist
Economies"  held at Laxenburg,  Austria, in March 1990.  These results are
available  upon  request  from  the  authors.7
Before  1989,  however,  the  frequent  devaluations  of the  official  exchange  rate
did  not  murceed  in  reducing  the  size  of the  premium.
A second  divergent  feature  relates  to the  wage setting. Wage
determination  is  critical  as there  is  no effective  *ndogenous  mechanism  of
wage restraint  in  a socialist  economy. In  Hungary  centrally  imposed  wage
norns  and  bargaining  rules  were largely  sustained  and  wage  drift  was
restricted.  This  was  not  true  for  Poland  where  wage  bargaining  can  best  be
interpreted  in  a  non-cooperative  setting  7. The  outcome  was stronger  wage  and
cost-side  pressure  through  to  prices. Polish  inflation  was consequently
powerfully  linked  to  changes  in  the  two  key flow  variables;  wages  and  the
exchange  rate
These  factors  are  important  but  not  suffic.ent  for  explaining  the  jump
into  high inflation  in 1989  in  Poland. There  was  undoubtedly  a sharp
deterioraLion  in  the  fiscal  accounts,  particularly  in  the  first  half  of 1989.
Revonue  losses  amounting  to  over  7%  of GNP  pusb-A  the  fiscal  deficit  close  to
8% of  GNP  . However,  it  required  continuous  depreciation  of the  exchange
rate,  liberalization  of food  prices,  major  shocks  to administered  prices  and
the  introduction  of an ex post  indexation  scheme  in  July 1989  to generate  a
wage-price  spiral  that  tipped  the  economy  into  hyperinflation.  At that  stage,
the  system  lacked  any  basic  anchors. Money  was  essentially  passive. Cost
side  effects  were  simply  passed  through  by producers  and  accommodated.  Money
7  A more  thorough  analysis  of  wage  setting  in  these  economies  is  contained
in Commander  and  Staehr  (1990).
8  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990)
9  Since  1981  the  fiscal  deficit  had  generally  been  restrained  to  under  1%
of  GNP and  in 1988  was  held to  0.22%. In  1989  the  deficit  expanded  to  over  7%
and  seignorage  to 13.5%  of  GNP.8
could  not  anchor  the  system  in  the  absence  of exchange  rate  and  wage
stability. Further,  with the  lifting  of price  controls,  and the  large
increases  in  administered  prices,  the  latter  could  no longer  anchor  the  system
adequately.  Sharp  upward  adjustments  to  administered  input  prices  in  late
10 1989  were initially  passed  through  to final  prices  by producers
Additional,  large  increases  in administered  input  prices  and  a maxi-
devaluation  at end-1989  contributed  to  high inflation  rates  in the  first  two
months  of the  stabilization  program. The  deceleration  of inflation  post-
February  1990  can  be attributed  not  only  to  a major  fiscal  correction  but to
the  reinstallation  of anchors  in  the  system  11. The  exchange  rate  and  wages
have  been the  principal  anchors  but  temporary  restraint  on  adjustments  to
remaining  administered  prices  has  also  been  applied. Measures  to  break  the
accommodating  role  of money  have  been implemented  through  independence  of the
Central  Bank,  interest  rate  policy  and  credit  ceilings. Tight  money,  input
price  adjustments  and  a fall  in domestic  effective  demand,  alongside  a trade
liberalization  aimed  at importing  internaticnal  prices  and  a  new relative
price  structure,  led  producers  in 'exposed'  sectors  --  particularly  consumer
goods  --  to lower  mark-ups. For  producer  goods,  constant  mark-ups  were
sustained  longer,  given  intra-producer  trades  and  a slower  shift  in the  demand
curve  12  These  measures  reduced  monthly  inflation  to  under  5%  by October
1990,  but  alongside  an output  decline  of around  28%  in  the  industrial  sector
over  the  first  eight  months  of 1990  and  an increase  in  unemployment  to 7.5%  of
10  A result  of  the  soft-budget  constraint  facing  enterprises  and  the  pricing
rules  operated  by those  enterprises.
11 For  a fuller  discussion  of the  1990  programme,  see  Coricelli  and  Rocha
(1990).
12  Frydman  and  Wellisz  (1990).9
13 the  labour  force
III. The  Motel
Prior  to  summarizing  our  model,  we hold  that  prices  are  a function  of
money,  the  exchange  rate,  foreign  prices  and  real  side  factors. An additional
feature  would  be the  inclusion  of a  choice  variable umnmarizing  the  planner's
preference  for  a given  price  level. The  sustaining  conditions  for  price
growth  can  be traced  both to the  fiscal-monetary  side  and  to the  discrete
effects  of  exchange  rate  adjustment.  In tlh.i  former  case,  the  rate  of
monetization  will  be directly  acted  on  by the  consolidated  fiscal  deficit. In
so far  as this  measure  adequately  incorporates  the  relevant  fiscal  and  quasi-
fiscal  accounts,  including  the  profit  and  loss  accounts  of the  Central  Bank,
this  provides  a means  by which  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  determine  monetary
expansion. Sustained  inflation  can  be attributed  to the  presence  of fiscal
14 deficits  that  cannot  be financed  through  debt  issue  on  a sustainable  basis
While  a fiscal  model  of inflation  can  explain  persistence  of inflation,
certain  features  of the  partially  reformed  socialist  economy  need  explicitly
to  be incorporated.  In  systems  where  administered  prices  are  significant,
budgetary  subsidies  arising  from  price  controls  would  tend  to  feed  through  by
the  same  channel. But  to the  extent  that  such  controls  repress  inflation  in
the  short  run,  elimination  of subsidies  would  result  in translation  of that
repressed  inflation  into  open inflation.  Horeover,  with regard  to the
13 The  fall  in  output  can in  part  be attributed  to the  size  of the  supply
shock  engendered  by further  massive  increases  to administered  input  prices  in
January  1990  in  the  context of  a  tight  monetary stance  (Calvo and
Coricelli,1990).  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  monopolistic  pricing  may  have
contributed  (Blanchard  et al,1990). Provisional  testing  for  structural  breaks
on  price  data  for  the  first  quarter  of 1990  do  not  however  point  to  a  significant
structural  break  in  pricing  behaviour.
14  Anand  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1987).10
exogenous  shift  factors  affecting  the  inflation  rate,  specific  weight  has  to
be attached  to the  role  of discrete  adjustments  to  administered  prices  by the
planner. Indeed,  major  disturbances  to the  price  level  in  both  Hungary  and
Poland  can  generally  be attributed  to  such  adjustments,  as in 1979,1982,1988
and  1989. Such  adjustments  can  be viewed  as a lagged  response  by the  planner
to  macroeconomic  imbalances,  particularly  excess  demand  in  goods  markets  and
as  an attempt  to  modify  the  structure  of relative  prices. However,  such
excess  demand  would  be determined  not  simply  by unanticipated  changes  to
foreign  price,  monetary  and  fiscal  impulses  but  also  by the  effect  of fixed
price  regimes.
The  dynamic  adjustment  is  also  affected  by the  timing  of price
decisions. Administrative  rules  generally  impose  long  lags  between
adjustments  of controlled  prices. The  timing  of changes  for  market  prices  is,
at least  in principle,  determined  by price  setters. A mixed  system  of
controlled  and  market  prices  leads  to  two  sources  of  non-synchronization  in
the  price  setting  15. The  first  relates  to the  non-synchronization  between
the  change  of controlled  and  the  change  of  market  prices. The  second  arises,
as in  market  economies,  from  the  decentralization,  and  thus  lack  of
coordination,  of price  setting  for  the  market  goods  16.  Liberalization  of
prices  for  certain  categories  of goods  is likely  to increase  the  flexibility
of the  price  system  but  by introducing  an element  of  non-synchronization  in
15  For a fuller  treatment  of this issue,  see Commander  and Coricelli
(1990).
16 As often underlined  in studies  of inflation  -- for example,  Taylor
(1979);  Pazos  (1972)  --  the  staggering  of  price  decisions  increases  the  inertia
in the  price  system.11
price  changes  can increase  the  inertia  17  Both  price  staggering  and  wage
indexation  could  be expected  to facilitate  translation  of shocks  to the  price
level  into  persistent  increase  in  the  rate  of inflation.  To the  extent  that
enterprises  operate  a constant  mark-up  rule,  wages  are  inflexible  and  the
planner  adjusts  administered  prices  in lagged  response  to  excess  demand  in
goods  markets,  this  would  provide  a  sufficient  explanation  for  the  persistence
of inflation.
The  model  we estimate  below  (and  whose  detailed  features  are  presented
in  Appendix  1)  describes  a simple  mark-up  pricing  system  in  which  price
movements,  either  through  government  controls  or through  the  behaviour  of
monopolistic  firms,  reflect  cost  movements  '  This  pricing  routine  has to  be
related  to the  absence  of any  strong,  market-based  restraint  on  either  the
price  or  wage side. Consequently,  both  price  and  wage  controls  have  been
intrinsic  to the  stability  of the  system  with  prices  and  market  power
restrained  by permissible  margins  on the  mark-up  and  wages  restrained  by
reference  to expected  inflation  and  some  association  to productivity.
The reduced  form  dynamic  models  for  prices  and  wages  that  we estimate
using  Hungarian  and  Polish  quarterly  data  are  written  as follows:
Prices
D  t(+MlDpt.l+Q2(Dwt-D(y/L)t)+Q3(yt-y*)44(Dpwt+Det)+aS((M/S)t.1  - (M/S)*t.1))
-a6(P-P*)t  l(1
17  This  could  partially  account  for  the  persistence  of  inflation,  at  around
4  percent  per  month,  for  Poland  after  February  1990.
la  This  characterization  appears  to  reflect  adequately  the  explicit  pricing
rules  adopted  in  both  Hungary  and  Poland  in  the  period  of  partial  reform;  IMF
(1990a  and  1990b);  Kornai  (1986).12
Wages
Dwt  4+BlDwct+£2(D(y/L)t)+£ 3(w-w  )t.1+B 4Dbmert+Bs((RS/P)t-  (RS/P)*t)  (2)
Consumer  prices  (eq.l)  are  related  to lagged  prices  (as),  unit labour  costs
(a2),  capacity  utilization  (a3),  import  prices  (o4),  an excess  demand  variable
(as)  --  constructed  as the  deviation  from  a perceived  'normal'  ratio  of
monetary  holdings  in the  household  sector  to retail  sales  --  and  a correction
term (a).  Wages  (eq.2)  are  related  to a  centralized  wage  norm (£1),  a
productivity  term (I2),  a  black  market  exchange  rate  premium  (&4)  variable
(for  Poland)  and  a  variable  (coefficient  4),  that  attempts  to  capture  the
sensitivity  of  wage  demands  to the  availability  of goods  in consumer  markets
9.  This  is  done  through  deviation  from  trend  of real  retail  sales  of
consumer  goods. Finally,  a correction  term (£3),  embodying  a real  wage
target,  is included.
The  specification  of the  correction  terms,  implying  some  convergence  in
the  period  studied  to equilibrium  values,  or simply  to certain  target  values
or  attractors,  deserves  some  further  comment  as socialist  economies  are
commonly  thought  to  be disequilibrium  regimes. Two  aspects  have to  be
emphasized.  First,  an error  correction  implies  the  presencc  of feedbacks,
which  induce  changes  in the  dependent  variable  when the  system  deviates  from
its  long-run  point  of attraction,  being  total  costs  or money  for  prices  or
19 We assume a  generally  positive  effect on wage demands of greater
perceived  availability  of goods.  However,  if increased  availability  led to
increased  labor supply  a decline  in the real  wage would follow. Aggravated
shortages  could  also  imply  that  a  higher  statistical  real  income  be required  to
achieve  the  same  real  level  of consumption.  We thank  an anonymous  referee  for
these  observations.13
prices  and  productivity  for  wages. This  does  not imply  any  concept  of
equilibrium,  such  as  market  clearing. Indeed  we emphasize  the  fact  that  such
systems  lack  endogenous  equilibrating  mechanisms  operating  via  the  labour
market  or capacity. However,  underlying  regularities  or rules  of price  and
wage  behaviors  can  be isolated. These  we found  to  have  been fairly  stable
during  the  1980s. Interestingly,  these  rules  were,  in the  case  of  pricing,
embedded  in the  institutional  setting  in  which  price  changes  explained  by cost
changes  were  permitted  and  justified. The  error-correction  approach  simply
implies  that  the  dynamics  is affected  by a tendency  towards  these  underlying
rules
IV.  Short  Run  Price  and  Vage  Dynamics:  Results  from  Ouarterlv  Models
The  reduced  form  equations  that  we now  present  in  Tables  2  & 3 for
Hungary  and  Poland  are  based  on quarterly  data  for  the  specified  periods. The
latter  are in  part given  by data  availability.  To explore  the  price-wage
interdependency  and  to  avoid  simultaneity  bias  we employ  the  three-stage  least
squares  procedure. Prior  to  estimating  the  dynamic  models,  we tested  for
stationarity  with  Dickey  Fuller  and  Augmented  Dickey  Fuller  tests. We
recognise  that  these  are  weak tests  but  conveniently  the  time  series  proved  to
be largely  integrated  of the  first  order,  I(1),  so that  first  differencing  of
the  data  was  appropriate. Estimation  was initially  done  with levels  with
discrete  price  and  wage  equations.  We then  estimated  in  dynamic  form  with the
specifications  requiring  truncation  of the  lag  polynomials  and  some
restrictions  on  coefficients.  The  correction  terms  represent  the  lagged
residuals  from  discrete,  truncated  levels  equations,  tested  for  non-
20  Monetary  variables  do  not  figure  in  the  correction  term,  despite  the  fact
that  domestic  money  and  prices  are  cointegrated.  We exclude  money  because  of
its  passive  and  accomodating  role  in such  economies.14
stationarity  of the  residuals. Finally,  the  equations  were tested  for
parameter  stability  and  for  sensitivity  to  changes  in semple  period.
1.  HungaxX:  1981(3)  - 1989(2)
The results  of simultaneous  estimation  of quarterly  price  and  wage
models  are  reported  in  Table  2.  Consumer  price  changes  are  related  to lagged
prices,  the  exchange  rate,  a  contemporaneous  and  lagged  unit  labour  cost  term
suasarized  in  a first  period  moving  average,  a  money  term  proxying  demand-
side  features,  and  a correction  term  relating  prices  to  unit  labour  costs.
Wages  are  related  to  consumer  prices,  productivity  in the  material  sector  and
a  correction  term,  specifying  a real  wage target. The  price  equation  retains
many of the  features  of the  annual  model  alluded  to above.
The  variables  are  stationary,  or I(0),  and  are  significant  at a 5% and
more  level. For  the  price  equation  the  overall  fit  is  quite  acceptable,  there
is  parameter  stability  when estimated  recursively  and  an  absence  of serious
autocorrelation. The  equation  is  not  sensitive  to altering  the  sample
period. The  wage  equation  is  more  problematic,  appearing  under-identified  and
with its  fit  deteriorating  seriously  toward  the  end  of sample.  Nevertheless,
both  equations  capture  reasonably  well  the  short-run  dynamics.
For  the  price  equation,  several  features  stand  out. A lagged  price  term  is
included  on the  right  hand side. Argument  for  inclusion  of this  term  relates  to  the
weight  of administered  prices  where  such  prices  can  be considered  to  have stronger
than  normal  properties  of exogeneity.  The  coefficient  on a one  period  lag  at 0.24
points  to the  fairly  high  degree  of inertia  in the  system. The impact  elasticity15
Table  2
Hungary:  Quarterly  System
Estimation  Method:  Three  Stage  Least  Squares
Sample:  1981.3  - 1989.2
Ramnic Model:
aguation  1:  DLCPI - c1 *  DLcpi.1 +  c2*  DLexr  +  c3  *dOlDulc
+  c4  *  DIM2/ret  +  c5  *  *enulc2
auation,  2:  DLwage - c6 *  DLpro  *  c7  *  DLcpi  +  c8  *  *cmw. 1 +  D84.4  +  D88.1
OuarterlX  System  Results'
Eguation  1:
DLcpi  - 0.23  *  DLcpi.1  +  0.23  *  Dlexr  +  0.65  *  dOlDulc  +
(2.70)  (4.11)  (6.49)
+  0.21  *  DLM2/ret  - 0.14  ecmulc2
(2.22)  (-1.87)
R2 -0.80;  e - 0.016;  F  - 17.73;  DW  - 1.87
Equation  2:
DLwage  - 0.86  *  DLcpi  +  0.19  *  DLpro  - 0.05  *  D84.4  - 0.05  *  D88.1  -
(5.94)  (1.89)  (-2.32)  (-2.26)
-0.52  *  ecmw-i
(-3.65)
R2-  0.65;  e - 0.022;  F  - 9.91;  DW  - 1.82
Legend  T
DLCPI  - The  first  difference  of log  of  consumer  price  index
DLWAGE  - The  first  difference  of log  of  wage index
DLEXR  - The  first  difference  of log  of  official  exchange  rate
dOlDulc - One  period  moving  average  of first  difference  of  Lwage-Lprod
DIX2/ret  - The  first  difference  of log  of  M2 over  retail  sales
DLPRO  - The  first  difference  of log  of industrial  production  /  industrial
employment
ecmw  - Lwage-  c1 +  c2 *  Lcpi
ecmulc  - Lcpi-  c1 +  c2 *  Lulc
1  - t-statistic  in  parenthesis16
with respect  to the  excharnge  rate  at 0.23  is greater  than  in the  annual  model,  but
could  be expected  given  the  more  active  exchange  rate  policy  and  sronger explicit
linkage  of domestic  to  foreign  prices  over  this  period. The  demand  pressure
variable  is  very significant.  However,  little  can  be said  in this  context  regarding
the  interactive  effects  on administered  and  market  prices  of demand  pressure  but the
elasticity  indicates  the  somewhat  diluted  translation  into  aggregate  price  increase.
In the  initial  single  equation  estimation,  we inserted  an output  gap  variable.
It could  have  been  expected  that  with  the  progressive  introduction  of market-based
rules  into  the  Hungarian  economy  that  a  more  conventional  output  to  price
relationship  would  emerge. Recursive  estimation  and  shortening  of the  sample  at the
end  of the  period  did indeed  result  in  the  term  picking  up significance  toward  the
end  quarters  but  closer  examination  of the  residuals  indicated  that  the  significance
was largely  taken  from  the  noise  associated  with  the  price  shifts  during  and  after
1988  and  the  term  was  not included  in  the  final  estimations.  The  unit  labour  cost
variable,  with  a moving  average  elasticity  of 0.64,  substantiates  the  powerful  link
of price  growth  to  costs,  as  would  be expected  from  the  model  elaborated  above. The
correction  term (ecmulc)  is the  argument  that  prices  are  cointegrated  with  unit
labour  costs  21. The  Dickey  Fuller  test  exceeds  the  5%  critical  value  for  the  null
,ypothesis  for  this  specification  2.  The  coefficient  en.ers  the  equation  with  the
right  sign  and  is significant  at the  5% level. The  mean lag  of adjustment  is
reasonably  rapid  at around  four  quarters.
The  fit  of the  price  equation  is  satisfactory.  Recursive  estimation  and  Chow
21  viz;  p-a 1ulc-"2  I(0)
22  The  Dickey  Fuller  test  gives  (t-statistics  in  brackets);
ecmulc-  -0.013*Constant+0.0007*Trend-0.71*ecmulc. 1
(-0.56)  (0.71)  (-.4.3)17
tests  prompt  inclusion  of a dummy  for  the  first  quarter  of 1988. There  is  no
serious  autocorrelation;  a feature  of the  model  even  when the  lagged  price  term  is
dropped  23. There  is  a slight  widening  of the  bands  for  the  recursive  estimations
at the  end  of the  period,  pointing  to larger  unexplained  variation  at the  end  of the
sample. One  step  residuals  confirm  this  feature  while  Chow  tests  show  a lack  of
smoothness  toward  the  end  of the  period,  with  a  persistent  spike  at 1988(1). This
is  unsurprising  given  the  timing  of changes  to administered  prices  and  the  tax
system  in  this  period. The  dummy  for  1988(1)  in the  single  equation  estimation  was
significant  but did  not  change  the  size  of the  other  coefficients  nor improve  the
overall  fit  or  properties  of the  model. Consequently,  in  the  final  system
estimation  it  was  omitted.
The  wage  equation,  though  reasonable,  is less  satisfactory.  The  equation
appears  under-identified  and  there  is  some  negative  autocorrelation  in the
residuals. There  is  a  very  marked  deterioration  in  performance  at the  end  of the
sample. No wedge  term  could  be adequately  specified  capturing  any  gap  between
producer  and  consumer  wage a I  there  is  no explicit  treatment,  due  to lack  of data
availability,  of the  wage tax  effect. Closer  examination  of the  descriptive
statistics  show  that  up to 1985  wage  changes  we.e  clustered  in the  first  quarter;
thereafter  the  annual  wage  round  gives  way  to  more  random  adjustments. Intra-
annual  wage  adjustments  appear  to  have  been adopted  as an inst'.tutional  routine
associated  with the  acceleration  in  consumer  prices  over  the  later  part  of the
sample. For  consumer  and  producer  prices  there  is  a similar  clustering  of changes
in  the  first  quarter. In  the  case  of productivity  --  measured  over  the  socialist
material  sector  --  changes  generally  fall  in  second  and  fourth  quarters. The  spike
23  Tests for  heteroscedasticity,  including  ARCH and Chi-square  normality
test,  proved  borderline  and  somewhat  ambiguous.18
in  the  fourth  quarter  can  partly  be explained  by the  structure  of the  wage  round  and
the  effect  of the  wage tax  in  associating  wage and  productivity  paths.  Stability
tests  moreover  picked  out  breaks  at 1984(4)  and,  as for  the  price  equation,  at
1988(1),  for  which  dummies  were inserted.  In  general,  institutional  particularities,
changes  to the  wage system  and  wage  tax  rules  and their  incomplete  specification  in
the  model  explain  the  limitations  of the  reported  equation  24.
Several  tentative  conclusions  on the  wage  side  emerge. In the  first  instance,
the  0.86  coefficient  on the  price  term  in the  wage  equation  points  to  the  strong
association  of  wage to  consumer  price  movements. There  appear  to  be no effective
unanticipated  price  changes  or  price  surprises. Testing  this  further  by inserting  a
price  surprise  variable  yielded  a weak  positive  coefficient  which  was  very
insignificant.  The  absence  of any  price  surprise,  despite  the  acceleration  in
inflation  over  this  period,  can  best  be explained  with respect  to  a real  wage target
maintained  by the  planner. Wages  appear  to  have  been  fixed  in relation  to announced
prices. Changes  to administered  prices  have  been  very largely  accomodated  by wages
over  this  period. To the  extent  that  centrally-given  wage  norms  have  aimed  to
impose  an inflation  penalty,  bargaining  has succeeded  in  reconverging  the  wage and
price  path.  The  productivity  term  is  likewise  significant  at  more than  a 5% level
and  its  coefficient  has  roughly  tlhs  same  magnitude  as for  market  economies. The
correction  term  is  written  as a real  wage  target,  is  very significant  and  points  to
25 a rapid  adjustment  speed  . It should  however  be interpreted  with  some  caution  as
an  observed  association  between  wage  and  price  variables  over  the  sample  periDd
rather  than  as a long  run  equilibrium  relationship.  It is evident  that  there  is  an
24  A fuller  discussion  can  be found  in  Commander  and  Staehr  (1990).
25  Dickey  Fuller  test:  Decmw-  -0.002*Constant+0.000l*Trend-0.56*ecmw.I
(-0.002)  (0.16)  (-3.29)19
underlying  linkage  between  price,  productivity  and  wage changes,  as suggested  by cur
model. Consequently,  the  wage  does  not  enter  as a  completely  exogenous  variable.
In suumary,  our  estimations  allow  us to  pin  down  some  key  dynamic  features  for
price  and wage  changes  over  the  1980s. While  foreign  prices  are important  in the
transmission  of inflation,  cost-side  factors  have  greater  weight. Demand-side
pressures  matter  and it  seems  likely  that  one  mechanism  is through  the  impact  on the
relative  prices  of administered  and  market  goods  as  a factor  determining  the  scale
of adjustment  to  administered  prices. Strikingly,  no standard  associati^,n  between
output  or capacity  utilization  and  prices  exists. This  emphasizes  the  lack  of an
underlying  mechanism  of equilibration  in the  economy  despite  the  intro-'uction  of
greater  market-based  features. Finally,  the  presence  of administered  prices  imparts
inertia  to the  system  but the  models,  as  presently  specified,  cannot  explicitly
capture  the  price-price  dynamics  associated  with  non-synchronisation  in  price
adjustment  over  administered  and  market  prices.
Poland  1983.4  - 1990.1
The  Polish  price  system  has  been subjected  to a set  of major  institutional
changes,  the  first  occurring  in 1982  with the  creation  of a mixed  system  of free  and
controlled  prices,  further  modifications  in 1988/89  and  a major  change  in  January
1990. Using  annual  data,  Chow  tests  and  recursive  estimation  identify  1982  as a
structural  break. Our  estimations  consequently  use  quarterly  information  for  the
post-1982  period. Preliminary  testing  for  a  break  in 1990(1)  does  not  indicate  a
comparable  break  in the  pricing  regime.
The results  of our  estimations  are  presented  in  Table  3.  Prior  to  estimating
the  system,  price  and  wage  equations  were run  discretely  to test  for  parameter
stability,  data  coherence  and  goodness  of fit. Prices  were  regressed  on  a lagged20
price  term,  a cost  variable,  a lagged  demand  pressure  variable  and  a correction
term. A lagged  price  term  is included  for  the  reasons  already  alluded  to in the
Hungarian  model.  In  this  specification,  the  measure  of money  was  M3, excluding
foreign  currency  deposits,  deflated  by retail  sales. Prices  are  cointegrated  with
unit  labour  costs  and  the  official  exchange  rate;  here  discretely  specified  rather
than  weighted  in  a total  cost  variable. In  the  wage  equation,  wages  were related  to
prices,  productivity  in  the  material  sector,  tho  exchange  rate  premium  and  a
variable  denoting  deviation  from  trend  of real  retail  sales. The  correction  term
reflects  cointegration  between  wages  and  prices,  the  exchange  rate  premium  and
26 productivity
Both  equations  appear  quite  satisfactory.  All  variables  are  highly
significant.  For  the  price  equation,  the  fit  is  very  acceptable,  the  variables  are
stable 7.  For  the  wage  equation  also  the  fit  is  very  satisfactory  but there  is
clear  evidence  (  detected  through  recursive  estimations  and  Chow  tests)  of a large
spike  at 1988.1  and  1989.1. We therefore  enter  dummy  variables  for  both  periods.
These  dummies  can  be interpreted  as representing  some  independent  wage-push,  which
occurred  in a  period  of increasing  social  unrest.
As indicated  in  Section  3,  we  used  a cost-plus  specification,  linking  the
short-term  dynamics  to an adjustment  to  an underlying  tendency  to a normal  mark-up
pricing  rule.  This  specification  includes  monetary  variables  only  as a determinant
of short  run  movements  and  not  a long-run  equilibrium  relation. While  this
hypothesis  is  consistent  with the  view  of  accommodating  monetary  policy,  we tested
26 We tested  for  the  order  of integration  of the  series,  which  indicated
they  are  all  integrated  of order  one (I(1)).
27  The bands  on the  recursive  estimates  narrow  with greater  unexplained
variation  only at the fourth  quarter  of 1989.  One step residuals  and the
Decreasing  Chow  test  support  this  and  suggest  possible  instability  over  the  final
quarter  of 1989.21
Table  3
Poland:  Ouarterly  System
Dynamic  Mode
Equation  1:  DLCPI-el*DLulc+c2*DLoer+c 3*DL(m3/r). 1+c 4*ecmp. 1+c 5*DLcpi.I
Equation  2:  DLWAGES-c 6*DLprem+c 7 *DLpro+ce*resret. 1+cg*ecmw. 1+c 1o*D881+c 11*D891
Correction  terms:
ECMP:  LCPI  - c1 + c2 * Lulc  +  c3 *  Loer
ECMW:  LWAGES  - c 4 +  c5  *  Lepi  +  c6  *  LPRO
Legend:
DL  - First  difference  of logs  of;
DLCPI  - Consumer  Price  Index
DLulc  - Unit labor  costs
DLoer  - Official  exchange  rate
DLwage - Average  Monthly  Wage Index
DLprem - Black  Market  Exchange  Rate  Premium
D881  - Dummy  for  first  quarter  of 1988-1,  0 elsewhere
D891  - Dummy  for  first  quarter  of 1989-1,  0 elsewhere
DL(m3/r)-  Ratio  of  M3 to  retail  sales
Resret - Deviation  from  trend  of real  retail  sales
DLpro  - Productivity  in  the  industrial  sector22
Poland  :  Ouarterly  System  Results
Estimation  Method:  Three  State  Least  Squares
1983.4  - 1990.1
Equation  1:  DLCPI  - 0.33  *  DLcpi. 1 +  0.43  *  DLulc  +  0.33  *  Dloer  +0.34  *  DL(m3/r). 1 -
(4.2)  (5.9)  (7.6)  (5.4)
-0.17*  ecmp. 1
(-1.6)
R2  - 0.98;  e - 0.04;  F  - 220.02;  DW  - 1.88
Eauation  2:  DLWAGE-  0.58  *  Dlpro  +  0.68  *  Dlopi  +  0.20  *  resret 1 - 0.40  *  ecmwl  +
(3.1)  (16.4)  (2.8)  (-4.5)
+  0.20  *  D881  +  0.24  *  D891
(5.8)  (6.6)
P;  - 0.93;  e  - 0.056;  F  - 60.86;  DW  - 2.12
Error  correction  eguations  (cointegration  tests)
Lwage(estimated)  - -5.30  *  Constant  +  0.81  *  Lcpi  '  1.33  *  Lpro
(-5.4)  (22.6)  (5.5)
Lwage(actual)-Lwage(estimated)-  ecmw
Lcpi(estimated)  - -0.22  *  Constant  + 0.63  *  Lulc  +  0.39  *  Loer
(-1.3)  (4.7)  (4.2)
Lcpi(actual)-Lcpi(estimated)-  ecmcpi
Dickey-Fuller  test
Decmw  - -0.028  *  Constant  +  0.001  *  Trend  -0.70  *  ecmw. 1
(-0.82)  (0.70)  (-4.40)**
Decmp  - 0.089  *  Constant  - 0.004  *  Trend  -0.82  *  *cmp. 1
(3.2)  (-3.3)  (-5.3)**
**  Significant  at 5  percent  level.23
empirically  for  the  presence  of a significant  long-run  relation  between  prices  and
money. Using  a simple  standard money  demand  approach  we indeed  found  the  presence
of cointegration  between  prices  and  money. However,  the  inflation  transmission
mechanism  is  very  poorly  reflected  by a  dynamic  equation  based  ont  this  long  run
tendency. This  strengthens  our  view that,  while  clearly  prices,  wages  and  monetary
aggregates  move together  in  the  long-run,  this  is  more  the  result  of  monetary
accomodation  than  a  causal  relation  rurming  from  money  to  prices.
The first  aspect  to  be emphasized  is  that  inflation  is  characterized  by a
relatively  high  degree  of inertia  throughout  the  period. This is  not  only  captured
by the  presence  of a lagged  inflation  term  in  the  regression,  but also  by a
relatively  low  coefficient  of the  correction  term,  implying  a somewhat  slow  reaction
to  deviations  from  a 'normal"  relation  between  prices  and  costs. This  pattern
accords  well  with the  observation  of a relatively  high,  and  stable,  inflation  over
the  period  1984-1987.  Moreover,  the  stability  of the  relation  throughout  the
period,  1983-1990  suggests  that  this  degree  of inertia  survived  during  the
acceleration  of inflation  post  1987. Although  the  coordination  problem  typical  of
system  with a large  number  of price  setters  did  not  affect  Poland,  the inertia  in
inflation  may  have  arisen  from  the  peculiar  features  of a  mixed  system  of market  and
controlled  prices  28  in  addition  to the  high degree  of de facto  indexation  of  wages
to  prices. Different  rules  and  timing  of  price  decisions  in  the  different  price
categories  likely  gave  rise  to  a substantial  staggering  of price  decisions  and  a
29 consequent  inertia  in inflation
2B See  Comander and  Coricelli  (1990)  for  an  analytical  treatment  of this
issue.
29  Disaggregating  for  the  price  equation  the  contribution  of each  variable
to  average  inflation  across  two  periods,  1983  to 1987  and  1988  to 1990,  we find
that for the former,  the exchange  rate and unit labour  costs are the most
important;  this  continues  to  be true  for  1988/89. The  monetary  variable  only24
The  wage  equation  helps  to stress  the  role  of  wages  in the  transmission  of
inflationary  impulses,  especially  in  the  period  1988-1990. First  we can  note  that
wages  have  been  de facto  almost  fully  indexed  to  prices  throughout  the  period.
Besides  the  inflation  term,  the  other  variables  entering  the  equation  show  an  effect
of productivity  on wages,  an  effect  of "availability'  of goods  on  wage demands  and,
finally,  some  effect  of changes  in  the  premium  of  black  market  over  official
exchange  rate  on wage  movements. The  latter  effect  may indicate  that  workers  are
concerned  with the  purchasing  power  of  wages  not  only  in terms  of domestic  goods,
but  also  of 'dollar-goods."  This  can  be explained  by the  presence  of shops  (Pewex
30 shops)  selling  foreign  goods  for  foreign  currency
The  relation  between  wages  and  productivity  is somewhat  puzzling. The  rather
high  coefficient  may  be partly  explained  by the  system  of bonus  payments,  and  by a
similar  seasonal  pattern  of  wages  and  productivity  changes. The  high (0.20)
elasticity  of  wages  with  regard  to  the  demand  pressure  variable  is  also  striking.
Contrary  to theories  of 'wage  illusion',  which  might  have  been  relevant  in the
1960's  and  1970's  31,  this  result  suggests  that  the  perception  of a  greater
availability  of goods  in  the  market  exerted  an upward  pressure  on  wage demands. The
correction  term  can  be interpreted  as a  real  wage  target,  adjusted  for  productivity
changes  and  the  resulting  payment  of  bonuses. Moreover,  the  speed  of adjustment  to
deviations  of  wages  from  the  "target"  level  is  rather  rapid  32.  The  coefficient  of
exerts  significant  inflationary  pressure  in 1989  when  wage-push,  devaluations
and  money  expansion,  primed  by the  fiscal  deficit,  accelerated  inflation.
30 Another  possibility  would  be that  of using  the  premium  as a proxy  for
prices  in  non-official  markets.
31  As, for  instance,  argued  by Charemza  and  Gronicki,  1988.
32  We checked  whether  a  price  surprise  term  would  induce  a  temporary  fall
in the real wage.  In all specifications,  the variables were not  only
insigniicant  but entered  with  positive  coefficients.25
that  variable,  together  with a coefficient  of nearly  0.7  on the  price  term,  points
to  an  high degree  of rigidity  of real  wages,  both in  the  changes  and  in the  levels.
We finally  note that  the  model,  as shown  by stability  tests,  survives  through
the  period  of  high,  almost  hyper,  inflation  of 1989-90. Interestingly,  this  seems
to suggest  that  administered  price  changes,  staggered  adjustment  of other  prices,
wage indexation  and  an effectively  indexed  exchange  rate,  maintained,  if  not
33 increased,  inertia  in  the  inflation  process
V.  Concluding  Remarks
We  have attempted  in this  paper  to set  up a simple  inflation  model  centered  on
the  transmission  process  and  on the  short  run  dynamics  of inflation  in  partially
reformed  socialist  economies. The  model  has  features  derived  from  market  economies
with few  producers  and  sticky  prices. It  also  attempts  to capture  some  of the
specific  attributes,  including  chronic  excess  demand  in goods  markets,  of socialist
economies. The  bulk  of the  empirical  analysis  concentrates  on the  post-1982  period
when significant  market-related  reforms  had  been implemented.  While  we accept  that
socialist  economies  have  been  characterized  by major  disequilibria,  we believe  that
appropriately  specified  and  tested  econometric  models  can  account  for  these
features,  without  explicit  recourse  to disequilibrium  econometric  procedures.  We
estimate  simultaneously  dynamic  price  and  wage  models.  For  both  Hungary  and
33 For the  high inflation  period  we attempted  to verify  three  standard
properties  of  high  inflationary  experiences  --  the  emergence  of  the  black  market
exchange  rate  as  the  main  determinant  of  inflation,  the  disappearance  of  inertia
in the  inflation  process  and  declining  influence  of the  official  exchange  rate
as inflation  accelerates. Replicating  a test performed  by Sachs  on Bolivia
(1986)  we carried  out  a  simple  monthly  regression  for  the  period  1988.1-1990.1,
relating  domestic  prices  to lagged  prices,  the  official  and the  black  market
exchange  rates. The  results,  identifying  inertia  with  the  coefficient  of lagged
inflation,  signalled  rather  an  increase  in  inertia  during  1989. A  similar  result
was obtained  through  a Kalman  Filter  estimation  of a time-varying-coefficient
regression.  This  can  be attributed  to  a  combination  of  wage indexation  and  the
presence  of  many  controlled  prices. Detailed  results  are  available  upon  request
from  the  authors.26
Poland,  the  estimated  equations  allow  us to  explore  quite  satisfactorily  the  role
and  weight  of foreign  prices  and  domestic  factors  in  propagating  inflation. Foreign
prices  are  shown  to matter  but  developments  on the  cost  side  are  critical  in
relating  exogenous,  policy  determined  adjustments  to the  price  level  to increase  in
the  rate  of inflation. Indexation  of wages  to  prices  obtains  for  most  periods  with,
however,  the  emergence  of  more  complex  bargaining  games  in  Poland  and  a
corresponding  inability  to  make  centralized  wage  norms  hold.  Polish  planners  relied
increasingly  on price  adjustments  for  addressing  the  macroeconomic  imbalances  that
emerged,  but these  only  further  destabilized  the  system  and failed  to address  the
underlying  sources  of these  imbalances.  In  contrast,  the  Hungarian  experience
points  to some  of the  ways in  which  administered  prices  can  be used  to stabilize  the
system;  nn issue  that  we explore  in  more  detail  elsewhere  3.
An important  implication  of our  results  is  that  nominal  anchors,  particularly
wage  restraints,  must  feature  in  stabilization  programs  adopted  in  reforming
socialist  economies. The  absence  of conventional  equilibrating  mechanisms  and  hence
of effective  market  restraints  on  wages  alongside  the  presence  of  monopolistic
pricing  behaviour  can  easily  result  in  'owerful  inflationary  pressures  and
ultimately  higher  than  warranted  output  costs.
34 Commander  and  Coricelli,  1990.27
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The  Model
The  economy  has two  sectors  --  a  material  and  non-material  sector. The
distinction  is  useful  with regard  both  to  wage  determination  and the  relative
influence  of foreign  prices. In  addition,  each  goods  sector  has  a controlled  and
non-controlled  price  sub-sector.  Inflation  is  a  weighted  average;
p-(l-a)pm+apn  (1)
where,
pS' 4iPmc+L2P8n  (la)
pn-Glpnc+%2pnn  (lb)
We assume  some  linkage  of domestic  to foreign  prices. In the  case  of the
material  sector  exposed  to  competition  from  the  hard  currency  zone,  export  and
import  prices  are  rendered  in  a standard  way.  Export  prices  are  world  prices  (Pw)
by the  export  exchange  rate (e);
p~mpw+e  (2)
Import  prices  are formed  by world  prices,  the  exchange  rate for  imports  and  tariffs
(T). A terms  of trade  parameter  (a)  is also  included;
Pma T (pw+e)  (3)
Including  control  and  non-control  prices,  total  prices  in the  material  sector
trading  outside  the  CMEA  system  would  be a  weighted  average  (k). The  latter  would
be positively  associated  with the  share  of  controlled  to total  prices.
Pmk  (pw+e)  (4)
For  the  non-material  sector  and  that  part  of the  material  sector  isolated  from  the




where  A-mark-up,  pi-price  of inputs;  I-inputs  volume,  w- wages;  L- labour  volume  and
y-output.
The  mark-up  rule  has  standard  properties.  Changes  in  output  prices  will thus
depend  on  unit factor  costs,  and  on the  mark-up  iA.  Foreign  y  ices  do not  matter.
To the  extent  that  the  mark-up  relates  to some  normal  level  of output  35,  the lower
the  weight  of  k in  eq. (4)  the  more likely  it is  that  price  change  will  be
positively  associated  with  the  level  of capacity  utilization.  Capacity  utilization
35  Coutts,  Godley  and  Nordhaus,  197830
can  be written  in the  usual  way as  deviation  of  output  from  trend;
cue-  (yt-Y)  (6)
The  greater  the  preponderance  of controlled  prices  in total  prices,  the  weaker
the  link  between  price  changes  and  capacity  levels. One  would  therefore  expect  a
classical  planned  economy  to  lack  any  conventional  equilibrating  mechanism. In
addition,  this  introduces  a relative  price  effect  so that  the  coefficients  depend
not  only  on components  of costs  but also  the  elasticity  of  JM  with  respect  to the
overall  domestic  price  index. Writing  in  rates  of  change  this  yields  the  following
linearized,  preliminary  price  equation;
p-00- 301(wL/y)+42(piI/y)+a 3(pv+e)+a 4(y-y )4.5pt.1  (7)
Prices  are  a positive  function  of lagged  prices,  the  mark-up,  foreign  prices
and  deviations  from  trend  for  capacity  utilization. Clearly,  foreign  prices  also
enter  through  o2 as I includes  imported  inputs. Price  setting  in  the  non-material
sector  would  be a subset  of  eq. (7),  obtained  by omitting  a3.
Eq. (7)  closely  resembles  a standard  mark-up  model  applied  extensively  to  non-
socialist  economies.  We now accomodate  some  stylized  features  of socialist
economies  --  the  widespread  presence  of goods  shortages  and  high liquidity  ratios.
We assume  that  the  planner  cares  about  macro-disequilibria  and  periodically  uses  the
price  level,  acting  on controlled  prices,  to reduce  perceived  imbalances.  Excess
purchasing  power  in  consumer  markets  may  generate  undesirable  effects  in  the  view  of
the  planner. First,  excess  liquidity  is  likely  to  raise  search  and  queueing  costs
for  consumers,  with  possible  negative  productivity  implications.  Similarly  a rising
gap  between  notional  and  effective  demand  could  of itself  reduce  effort  and  hence
productivity;  a likely  response  when the  labour/leisure  trade-off  is  constrained
While  this  will  ultimately  show  up as  a real  side  effect,  the  presumed  concern  with
relative  prices  on the  part  of the  planner  suggests  that  demand  pressure  in  goods
markets  can  best  be captured  in  a  price  equation  by a  variable  ((M/S)-(M/S  ))
measuring  deviation  from  a perceived  'normal'  ratio  of monetary  holdings  in  the
household  sector  37  to  retail  sales. This  indicates  the  measure  of excess
purchasing  power  in  consumer  markets  and  hence  the  assumed  demand  side  pressure  for
relative  price  adjustment  on the  part  of the  planner  38. The  inclusion  of both  an
36 This  latter  effect  is  in  fact  broached  in  the  disequilibrium  literature
which indicated  the  possible  negative  effect  on labor  supply  due to shortages
in  consumption  goods  markets.  With  full  employment  institutionally  guaranteed,
one  would  expect  a reduction  in  effort  per  unit  of time  worked.
37  In these  economies  the financial  sector  is genuinely  segmented  with
household  and  enterprise  savin 6s passing  through  distinct  circuits.
38 Alternatively,  invoking  Walras'  Law  we can simply  assume  that  excess
demand  in  goods  markets  translates  into  excess  supply  in  the  money  market,  viz;
ED-  H/p-Md/p. With the  expectations  term  given  as lagged  inflation,  this  can
be derived  from  a standard  money  demand  function  of the  form;
Md/p-  aO+a 1y+a 2pt.1.  The  interest  rate  is  assumed  irrelevant.31
output  gap  and  an  explicit  purchasing  power  variable  is  an  attempt  to  pin  down  the
particular  excess  demand  features  of  these  economies  when  controlled  and  market
prices  co-exist  and  when  the  planner  monitors  their  relative  price.  To  the  extent
that  supply  remains  insensitive  to  price  changes,  one  would  expect  a  strongly  damped
equilibrating  relation  between  shortage  and  inflation.
Before  turning  to  the  wage  setting,  we  can  now  set  up  in  dynamic  form  the
following  inflation  equation,  where  D is  a  first  difference  operator  and  a% is  the
correction  term.
Dpt-a 041  (Dwt-D(y/L)t)+a2(yt-y)+a 3(Dpwt+Det)+4(  (M/S)t.1  - (H/S)*t.1
.5(p-p*)t.1+%Dpt_1  (8)
With  regard  to  wage  determination,  we  work  from  the  following  particularities
of  the  socialist  economy.  First,  an  excess  demand  for  labour  regime  obtains
throughout.  No usual  convex  relationship  between  labour  market  pressure  and  wage
growth  obtains.  Second,  the  restrictions  on  profit  maximizing  behaviour  at  the
level  of  the  enterprise  39  --  the  presence  of  soft  budget  constraints  --  implies,  in
combination  with  full  employment,  that  the  wage  share  would  not  necessarily  be
endogenously  restrained  in  some  channel  given  by  productivity  and  prices  . To  the
extent  that  a  true  exposed  sector  emerges  and  acts  as  wage  leader,  then  the  wage
share  could  be  expected  to  be  a  stationary  stochastic  variable  40;  in  the  absence  of
this  condition  wage  controls  remain  a  basic  precondition  for  restraint.  Accordingly,
wages  are  treated  as  largely  exogenous  and  structured  by  centrally  determined  norms.
Productivity-related  wage  components  --  a  feature  of  all  partially  reformed
economies  --  introduce  a  crude  association  to  average  productivity,  rather  than
marginal  products.  We circumvent  the  more  complex  dynamics  ass(ciat-ed  with  plant-
level  bargaining,  relying  rather  on  recursive  estimation  to  test  for  the  stability
of  parameters  in  the  wage  equation.
Distinguishing  again  over  material  and  non-material  sectors,  aggregate  wage
growth  is  a  weighted  average.  In  the  material  sector,  wages  are  set  in  relation  to
price  and  productivity  changes,  with  the  latter  linked  to  plant-level  performance.
In  the  non-material  sector  wage  growth  adjusts  to  the  centrally  determined  rate  of
annual  expansion.  In  so  far  as  total  wages  converge  to  productivity  corrected  wage
levels  for  the  material  sector,  a  faster  rate  of  productivity  increase  in  the
material  sector  would,  ceteris  paribus,  accelerate  inflation.  A diluted  discipline
from  international  prices  implies  a  structural  inflation  term  (qm-qn)  with  an
39  If  enterprises  face  no  hard  budget  constraint,  no  systematic  association
between  the  ability  to  pay  above  agreed  norms  and  actual  wage  payments  could  be
expected.  The  distribution  of  the  wage  drift  would  be  random.
40  Expected  wage  inflation  would  be  related  to  growth  in  prices  and
productivity;  E(Dw)-Dyt+Dqt.  An  error  correction  model  would  then  take  the
following  shape;  Dwt-.o..al(L)(Dqt+Dyt)-02(wt.1  -qt.1  yt-y)+et.32
unambiguous  positive  association  between  productivity  growth  and  inflation.
Wage  contracts  are  of annual  duration  with explicit  commitment  to real  wage
stability.  Unlike  in  models  of compulsory  arbitration  with  a penalty  exacted
41 through  lagged  wage adjustment  ,  such  outcomes  in  a socialist  economy  context
require  a price  surprise  with  no term  cor  ection. Available  evidence  indicates  in
general  adherence  to a  real  wage  target  . Any  penalty  might  better  be measured  as
the  gap  between  statistical  real  wages  and  real  wages;  but  that  is  beyond  the  scope
of this  paper.  In the  absence  of formal  indexation  rules,  except  in Poland  in  1989,
it is important  to establish  whether  de facto  indexation  is  of a  backward  or
forward-looking  type.  In this  regard  there  is  a degree  of ambiguity  in  both the
Polish  and  Hungarian  cases. In principle  a form  of forward-looking,  or ex  ante
indexation  should  be operating. Indeed,  increases  related  to the  centrally  imposed
norm reflects  expected,  or  planned,  inflation.  In this  case
Dw"c  -A  .lo  1(Dpt)  ,  (9)
vhere  wcf-centrally  imposed  wage  and  E is the  expectation  operator. The  real
wage  is a  decreasing  function  of expectational  errors,  or inflation  surprises  43
Dwct-ala2p  -pag2(Dpt  -Et.1  (Dpt)).  (10)
An ex post  indexation  scheme  would  imply
Dwc"1+a 2Dpt1  (11)
Any increase  in the  inflation  rate,  Dpt,  reduces  the  real  wage,  while  the
indexation  scheme  introduces  inertia  in  the  inflationary  process,  slows  down  a
reduction  in  the  inflation  rate  and  makes  the  wage  setting  insensitive  to  any
announcement  effects  (which  in  the  ex ante  specification  will immediately  reduce  the
increase  in  wages)  4.  Consequently,  when  a2-l  and  the  surprise  term  is
insignificant,  one  can  either  assume  that  an effective  ex ante  indexation  scheme  was
in force,  and  that  actual  inflation  and  planned  inflation  were consistently  equal,
or that  an  ex post indexation  operated,  with  the  frequency  of changes  in  wages  (de
facto  and  not that  associated  with the  annual  wage round)  higher  than  that  of  price
changes. Combining  these  features  with the  postulated  wage-average  productivity
41  An annual  wage cycle with no mid-term  correction  would yield the
following  penalty:  wrt-'pt2-2  'Ept.24
42 See, inter  alia,  Adam,  1979;  IMF,  1990
43 The residuals  of an univariate  process  for Pt  may be assumed  or an
acceleration  term,  D(Dpt),  can  approximate  the  surprise  term.
44 The  forward-looking  indexation  scheme  is  normally  viewed  as  superior  to
backwood-lookinmg  schemes  with regard  to the macroeconomic  implications  (eg
Simonsen  1986).  Recently,  Fischer(1988)  has shown  how the ranking is more
complex  than  assumed  in  Simonsen,  dependjng  crucially  on  the  exchange  rate  policy
followed  by the  country.33
relationship  yields  the  following  equation  to  be estimated;
Dwt-& 0+B 1Dwct+&2(Dqm,+Dpt-D(l+tj))  (12)
where;  wct-  centrally  imposed  wage growth  (applying  to  all  sectors);  qm- rate  of
change  in average  productivity  in  material  sector; pt-  price  inflation;  t 1- tax
rate  on wage  growth  exceeding  (Dwct+Dqmt).  In  other  words,  wage  expansion  could  be
expected  to  result  from  a centralized  component  related  to  expected  inflation  and
drift  attributable  to productivity  changes  in the  material  sector,  offset  by tax
increases.
Eq. (12)  would  not  adequately  capture  a clear  feature  of recent  Polish
history;  the  persistent  increase  in  real  wages  up to the  1970's  and  apparent
episodes  of  wage  push  during  the  1980's. Assuming  bargaining  and  a concern  on the
part  of  workers  with  a real  wage target,  the  insertion  of an  error  correction  term
in  the  equation  appears  appropriate:
Dwt-B0+B,Dwct+B2(Dqmt+Dpt-D(l+t1))+13(w-w*)t.1  (13)
where,  w*-p.  As with the  price  equation,  we need to  modify  eq. (13)  by introducing
features  specific  to  a socialist  economy.
We consider  two  variables  which  may  affect  the  wage dynamics. The  first  is
linked  to the  fact  that  the  official  price  index  may  not  reflect  the  actual
inflation  rate  in economies  with significant  parallel  and  black  goods  markets  4
In such  a context,  wages  are  likely  to  be indexed  to  an actual  or implicit  price
index  which  incorporates  unofficial  markets. We select  the  premium  of the  black
market  exchange  rate  over the  official  exchange  rate  (bmert)  as a proxy  for  this
unrecorded  inflation.  The  second  tries  to capture  the  sensitivity  of wage  demands
to the  availability  of goods  in  the  economy. In  economies  characterized  by chronic
shortages,  availability  of  goods  may significantly  affect  wage  demands. Assuming
'rationality'  in  the  wage setting,  greater  availability  should  induce  demand  for
higher  wages,  as these  can  be translated  into  higher  real  consumption.  An inverse
relation  between  availability  of goods  and  wage increases  would  suggest  some  sort  of
'wage  illusion'.  A variable  measuring  the  deviation  from  trend  of inventories  of
consumer  goods  at the  retail  level  ((RS/P)t-RS/P)  t)  may  approximate  availability,  as
traditionally  inventories  of  consumer  goods  are  kept to  a minimum  in socialist
countries  4.  The general  form  for  the  dynamic  wage  equation  now  becomes: 47
Dwt-4  +B1wct+B2(Dqm+Dpt-D(l+tl))+B3(w-w*)t.I+a 4Dbmert+15((RS/P)t-(RS/P)*t)  (14)
45 More  relevant  for  Poland  than  for  Hungary
46 Kornai  (1985).
47 However,  as  we hold  that  consumer  goods  market  imbalances  and  currency
substitution  have  been  more  powerful  in  the  Polish  case,  we  will  drop  these  terms
at the  outset  from  the  Hungarian  estimations.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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